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Assessing Competition Issues in the Amended Google 
Book Search Settlement 
Randal C. Picker* 
 
Late in the evening on Friday, November 13, 2009, Google, the 
Authors Guild and a group of publishers filed their proposed 
amended settlement agreement to resolve the litigation over 
Google Book Search. The original settlement agreement (“OSA”) 
had been scheduled for a fairness hearing in October, but with 
hundreds of objections filed—including, most notably, a statement 
of interest by the Department of Justice—the settlement parties set 
to the task of altering their settlement. 
We should start big picture and then drop down a level. The 
amended settlement agreement (“ASA”) is clearly designed to 
respond to the Department of Justice’s statement of interest. That 
goes both to the Rule 23 class action issues identified by DOJ in 
that filing and to the competition issues as well. I discuss the 
successes and failures of that response below. France and Germany 
had objected to the breadth of the original settlement agreement 
especially as it applied to works by non-United States authors. The 
ASA responds to that by narrowing the scope of the works covered 
by excluding many foreign works. In the face of the objections, 
narrowing coverage is an understandable and probably prudent 
course, but of course it comes at the cost of lost access to users and 
a greater risk of marginalization for authors who will now be 
invisible to those who restrict their attention to the new Google 
database. 
Privacy advocate were very unhappy with the OSA and will be 
no happier with the ASA, except now they will find the studied 
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unconcern about their issues willful. There are very few changes in 
the ASA that address privacy issues.1 Some librarians have feared 
that Google will be able to charge monopoly prices for the 
institutional subscriptions that will be created through the 
settlement. The DOJ statement of interest didn’t address that 
concern nor did I discuss it in my original paper on competition 
issues. The Supreme Court has been very clear that high prices 
alone don’t violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, so long as the 
monopoly is obtained legitimately.2 Google may be addressing 
pricing issues through individualized negotiations with libraries, 
but the overall terms of the new ASA don’t create a mechanism to 
control any monopoly power that will emerge from GBS. And 
there are undoubtedly large classes of other objectors—publishing 
agents for example and photographers—who presumably will see 
few changes that address their issues. 
With that as a broad sweep, turn in detail to the competition 
issues in the ASA. In my original paper on the settlement, I 
addressed three competition policy issues: (1) a risk that antitrust 
immunities might attach to the approval of the settlement 
agreement; (2) concerns about coordinated pricing in the consumer 
purchase model created by the agreement; and (3) a concern that 
the OSA permitted Google (and only Google) to use the orphan 
works.3 DOJ identified a fourth competition issue, namely, that 
the agreement operated as a horizontal price agreement among 
publishers at the wholesale level. 
The ASA makes changes to respond to each of these. The 
parties have waived the benefit of any possible antitrust immunities 
that might otherwise attach to the approval of the ASA and that 
                                                
1 See Cindy Cohn, Google Book Search Settlement Revised: No Reader Privacy 
Added, Nov 14 2009 (online at http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/11/google-book-
search-settlement-revised-no-reader-pr). 
2 Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v linkLine Communications, Inc., 129 SCt 1129 
(2009). 
3 Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works 
Monopoly?, 5 J Comp Law & Econ 383 (2009). 
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has important consequences for the timing of any possible 
challenges by DOJ. They have also made changes to the relevant 
language on pricing under the ASA. The most favored nations 
clause (OSA 3.8(a)) is gone. Most interestingly, as to the orphan 
works, the parties have created a new player in GBS, the 
Unclaimed Works Fiduciary (UWF). The UWF is to take over 
some of the responsibilities for managing unclaimed works that the 
OSA had assigned to the new book registry created in the 
settlement. 
Now I feel like Moses: I can see the promised land but 
apparently I can’t get there. Creating the UWF is a nice way to 
solve the conflicts problem identified by DOJ. DOJ had expressed 
a concern that holders of unclaimed works didn’t necessarily have 
the same interests as those of active rightsholders. The UWF 
mechanism enables separate representation of those interests. But 
the settling parties have limited the role of the UWF to merely 
stepping into the shoes of the registry in some circumstances. They 
could have broadened the role for the UWF to have the UWF step 
into the shoes of the rightsholders of unclaimed books instead. 
Had that been the focus, the UWF would then be an elegant 
solution to the going forward problem of how to license the 
orphan works. 
I .  I t ’ s  A l l  A b o u t  t h e  T i m i n g :  T h e  N o  Noer r  C l a u s e  
We might start deep in the revised filing—page 362 out of 377 in 
the Adobe .pdf of the blacklined revisions version if you are 
following along—which adds a new Paragraph 17 to the proposed 
final judgment: “this Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal is not 
intended to and does not provide any antitrust immunities to any 
Persons or parties.” As the plaintiffs note in their memorandum of 
law in support of their motion for preliminary approval of the 
amended settlement agreement, this is intended to address the 
possibility that some sort of Noerr-Pennington immunity might 
Randal C. Picker Amended Google Book Search Settlement 
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attach to approval of the settlement agreement by a federal district 
court.4 
This is of critical importance, as it changes substantially the 
opportunities and choices that the Department of Justice faces 
with regard to the settlement agreement. With the possibility of 
immunity attaching, DOJ faced a possible all-or-nothing judgment 
about whether to challenge the agreement now. Failing to mount a 
challenge now might forfeit that challenge seemingly forever. Put 
that way, that might suggest why Noerr-Pennington immunity 
should clearly not attach, but the case law is unclear on this. 
Focus on why the waiver matters for the timing of a possible 
DOJ inquiry. The no-Noerr clause preserves the antitrust issues 
going forward and allowing time to pass will give us a better 
assessment of what matters in the settlement and what does not. Is 
the consumer purchase sales model an Edsel or the second coming 
of, well, Google itself? Is this something that the public really 
wants or not? If not, possible competition issues about the pricing 
algorithm are purely academic and not worthy of attention for 
either the court system or DOJ. 
So why fight now? Again, absent the Noerr waiver, DOJ would 
have had to choose whether to fight now but instead DOJ can now 
wait to assess how the pricing issues actually play out under the 
agreement. DOJ can use the normal tools of antitrust 
investigations—civil investigative demands and the like—as it 
would for any other joint venture. 
There is also the question of how the Noerr wavier should 
matter for Judge Denny Chin. We should start, perhaps 
surprisingly, with the Second Circuit. Were I an appellate judge, I 
suspect that I would find it quite difficult to conclude that Judge 
Chin had abused his discretion were he to conclude that the 
pricing issues should not be addressed now but instead should be 
deferred to a point in time in which the actual operation of 
                                                
4 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval 
of Amended Settlement Agreement, p.8. 
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agreement has been observed. We just don’t know where we are on 
the pricing issues—both in the operation of the ASA mechanisms 
and on the all-important question of how much the market wants 
the products—and therefore as an appellater judge I wouldn’t find 
it unreasonable for Judge Chin to push these issues out to the 
future now that the Noerr waiver gives him that option. 
I I .  P r i c i n g  R e v i s i o n s  i n  t h e  A S A  
Turn to the changes in the pricing mechanisms themselves. In the 
original settlement, the consumer-purchase pricing mechanism 
struck me—and vastly more importantly, the Department of 
Justice—as raising concerns about coordinated horizontal pricing 
among the authors with Google as the facilitator. That struck me 
as wholly unnecessary to the overall deal and therefore quite 
surprising. The revised settlement backs away from that framing in 
making two changes to the critical operative language. The new 
agreement makes clear that the consumer-purchase pricing 
mechanism is intended to imitate the pricing that would emerge in 
a competitive market and is to be done unilaterally by Google.5 
That was the baseline that I pushed for in my original paper. 
While I should spend some time considering the actual language 
more carefully, it clearly moves in the right direction. 
There still is this characterization question: should we think of 
this arrangement as a horizontal arrangement or as a vertical 
arrangement much more like iTunes? The fact that the authors are 
                                                
5 ASA 4.2(c)(ii)(2): “Google will develop the Pricing Algorithm unilaterally, with 
no involvement of or control by the Registry or any Rightsholder; provided, however, 
that Google employees and contractors who may be Rightsholders are not precluded 
from performing their assigned duties with respect to development of the Pricing 
Algorithm. In developing the Pricing Algorithm, Google will analyze sales data to ensure 
the reasonableness of the Pricing Algorithm. The Pricing Algorithm shall base the 
Settlement Controlled Price of a Book, on an individual Book by Book basis, upon 
aggregate data collected with respect to Books that are similar to such Book and will be 
designed to operate in a manner that simulates how an individual Book would be priced 
by a Rightsholder of that Book acting in a manner to optimize revenues in respect of such 
Book in a competitive market, that is, assuming no change in the price of any other 
Book.” See also ASA 4.2(b)(i)(2). 
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acting in unison with Google is what pushes this towards 
horizontal characterization and nominal antitrust doctrine—think 
Socony-Vacuum—is quite unfriendly to any horizontal agreement 
on prices6 even, perhaps, one that says we are going to agree on 
competitive prices. That is almost certainly to allow form to trump 
reality if the ASA actually operates in the manner that it sets out. 
The second pricing issue is the question of whether or not 
there is horizontal price-fixing among publishers at the wholesale 
level through the 63%/37% split with Google. The agreement adds 
a new mechanism that allows either Google or a rightsholder to 
request a renegotiation of the revenue split. Under ASA 4.5(a)(iii), 
either side can walk away from the deal as to the books in question 
if a new agreement cannot be reached. I need to think about this 
more to see whether this really addresses the concerns expressed by 
DOJ. 
I I I .  T h e  U n c l a i m e d  W o r k s  F i d u c i a r y :  S o  C l o s e  a n d  
Y e t  S o  F a r  A w a y  
The most interesting change in the amended settlement agreement 
is the appearance of the unclaimed works fiduciary. The DOJ 
statement of interest suggested that there was a conflict between 
the active rightsholders and the orphan authors which in turn led 
them to question whether the class representatives could 
adequately represent the orphan authors. DOJ suggested as a 
possible solution that the orphan works be excluded from the 
settlement but obviously also understood that losing the orphan 
works would subtract much of the value of Google book search 
itself. 
The UWF and associated changes are a different response to 
this problem. It is important to try to be clear on what the UWF 
structure does and doesn’t do, but let me describe the changes first. 
                                                
6 “Even though the members of the price-fixing group were in no position to 
conrrol the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would 
be directly interfering with the free play of market forces.” United States v Socony-
Vacuum Oil Col, 310 US 150, 221-22 (1940). 
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There are two critical changes. First, the ASA splits the powers 
that had previously been assigned to the registry between the 
registry and the new UWF. Section 6.2(b)(iii) structures this as a 
delegation of certain of the powers possessed by the registry to the 
UWF. As that suggests, I think it would be a mistake to think of 
this as a change in the powers available under the agreement but 
instead it is just an allocation of those powers to two different 
actors. Second, the amended agreement alters how revenues 
attributable to unclaimed books will be spent (ASA 6.3(b)). This 
change had been anticipated—indeed it was invited by the DOJ 
filing—and the amended agreement provides those funds be used 
to a number of ends, including the location of orphan authors; 
contributions to literary-based charities; and eventually escheat to 
the state. 
It is just as important to understand what the UWF cannot do. 
The UWF is a nice way to solve the conflicts problem identified by 
DOJ, but the settling parties have limited the role of the UWF to 
merely stepping into the shoes of the registry in some 
circumstances. They could have broadened the role for the UWF 
to have the UWF act for rightsholders of unclaimed books instead. 
Take that idea in pieces. First, there are a number of situations 
in the agreement in which rightsholders can exercise rights. Of 
course, the very exercise of rights requires someone to act actively 
to do so. That is well and good if we have an active rightsholder, 
something of a problem if we do not. Before, with orphan 
rightsholders, we were stuck, but now the agreement creates 
someone who might play that role, namely the UWF. Look at two 
situations in the agreement itself and then consider the broader 
licensing question for orphan works. 
ASA 3.3(a) addresses display uses of books by Google. That 
turns on the status of a book as commercially available and that 
status is subject to dispute, either by a rightsholder or by the 
registry. This seems like a natural setting for the UWF to act 
instead of the registry. ASA 3.5 addresses the right to remove 
books from the database and creates a broad right in favor of 
Randal C. Picker Amended Google Book Search Settlement 
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rightsholders to remove their works from the database. Again this 
is tied to having an active rightsholder but the agreement does not 
convey a similar right of the UWF who we should think of as 
acting for the orphan rightsholders. This contrasts strongly with 
other situations in which the UWF is given the authority to act, 
such as control over preview uses (ASA 4.3(g))) or the creation of 
new revenue models (ASA 4.7). 
Focus on the all-important question of the licensing of the 
orphan works to competing database providers. We should start 
with the timing question. My analysis above of the pricing issues 
suggests that there are good reasons for DOJ or Judge Chin to 
leave for a later time the question of whether these arrangements 
are anti-competitive. Given the Noerr waiver, DOJ will have full 
authority to challenge these arrangements at a later point in time 
when more information is available as to how they are actually 
functioning. 
I don’t think DOJ is similarly situated with regard to orphan 
works licensing. It isn’t clear to me on what basis they could 
challenge Google or the Authors Guild for failing to create a 
license of the orphan works to another competitor. As I have tried 
to frame this in my second paper on the settlement, the orphan-
works licensing issue is fundamentally a question of government 
licensing design—almost a government franchising question—and 
much less a traditional antitrust question.7 
We might also look briefly at the history of licensing in 
ASCAP and BMI as that is the most natural US comparison to 
the collective copyright regime being established in the settlement. 
Focus on two highlights—or lowlights depending on your 
perspective—in ASCAP and BMI.8 First, we have been operating 
under antitrust consent decrees since 1940. Full stop. That should 
                                                
7 Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Innovation: Framing Baselines in the Google Book 
Search Settlement, GCP: The Antitrust Chronicle, October 2009 (online at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499482). 
8 I discuss this in greater detail in Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission 
Goods: When Should We Invest in Reducing Entry Barriers?, 72 U Chi L Rev 189 (2005). 
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be thought to be remarkable. Second, the government has 
struggled to create meaningful alternatives to the blanket license in 
that time. In a recent iteration, implemented in mid-2001 in a new 
amended final judgment, the government hopes to get that new 
license structure by encouraging competition through the entry of 
new performing rights organizations (“PROs”). But they have 
done that by trying to limit the scope of the license terms of 
ASCAP and BMI themselves rather than by facilitating direct 
licensing opportunities for a new PRO. All of that means that 
there is not a particularly direct within-antitrust route to broader 
licensing of the orphan works. Refusals-to-deal doctrine is 
uncertain enough—read Aspen Skiing and Trinko—without 
layering on top of that the fact that the license is being sought for 
the works of third parties. 
That means it is far superior to have a solution to this issue 
within the settlement agreement itself. In my original paper, I 
suggested creating some mechanism to enable this possibility going 
forward as I thought that it might be difficult to craft licenses as 
part of the current settlement. I wasn’t sure what mechanism 
might make sense. At a House Judiciary Committee hearing on 
the settlement, Congressman Hank Johnson suggested the 
possibility of a fiduciary to act on behalf of the orphan works 
holders.9 The parties have now done exactly that in the revised 
                                                
9 Rep. Johnson stated: “No, I understand. I understand. So you—it’s totally 
impossible to have a group that represents the orphan works owners. But perhaps there 
could be some entity set up that would be like a fiduciary, a guardian ad litem, if you will, 
for the orphan works owners.” He later asked me: “Well let me ask you Professor Picker 
for his response. Why should Google be the only entity permitted to sell access to orphan 
works?” I responded:  I guess I’d start where you started which was the question of how 
are the orphan works represented in the case. So in many class actions or in bankruptcy 
settings where you’ve got for example in tort situations you’ve got current tort victims and 
then you’ve got the possibility of future tort victims. It’s pretty routine to appoint a 
separate representatives just as you said that’s guardian ad litem for those future 
claimants. And so the natural approach here would have been to appoint an independent 
representative as a guardian of litem for the orphan works. Had that been done, God only 
knows exactly what kind of licensing scheme would have emerged and whether that 
licensing scheme would have involved an exclusive license or would have involved a broad 
license. … ” Hearing of the House Judiciary Committee, Competition and Commerce in 
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settlement save for the fact that they have unnecessarily hobbled 
the UWF. 
Consider an alternative possibility. Section 6.7 of the original 
settlement agreement created an authorization in favor of the 
registry to act on behalf of the rightsholders in certain 
circumstances. That is unchanged in the ASA. But we need a new 
section 6.8, Authorization of Unclaimed Works Fiduciary, to 
create powers to act on behalf of the rightsholders of unclaimed 
books. Such an authorization would make it possible for the UWF 
to license the unclaimed works to third parties, just as the 
settlement agreement authorizes the UWF to act in various ways 
in its dealings with one particular licensee of those works, namely 
Google. 
Consider briefly the question of whether we think the registry 
or the UWF can license the orphan works under the terms of the 
ASA. I don't think that the analysis is changed from the original 
settlement. ASA 6.2(b)(ii) authorizes the license of works by the 
registry and by the UWF “to the extent permitted by law” just as 
the former OSA 6.2(b) did. My understanding is that Google does 
not believe that that provision actually enables either the registry or 
the UWF to license the works to third parties and that they instead 
believe that legislation would be required by Congress to make that 
operative. Be very clear: the settlement agreement is giving Google 
rights directly to use the orphan works. Google is not getting 
rights to the extent permitted by other law. It is that equivalence 
which the settlement agreement should seek to create and the 
clever solution, suggested by Congressman Johnson and 
implemented in the ASA, of adding a fiduciary now makes that a 
real possibility. 
The amended agreement contains a new resale provision (ASA 
4.5(b)(v)(2)). That provision isn’t completely clear on what it 
accomplishes but it seems to be limited to individuals who wish to 
compete in consumer sales with Google. This seems to be a 
                                                                                                           
Digital Books, September 10, 2009. 
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program in which other sellers can effectively act as agents for 
Goolge in the sale of the books. Google will host and serve the 
books, so Google presumably will see much of the transactional 
information that arises from the sales. Amazon expressed little 
interest in this program at the House Judiciary committee hearing. 
C o n c l u s i o n  
Google takes products out of beta status slowly, even while it is 
making substantial improvements in the product. Objectors will 
see the amended settlement agreement as a mixed bag, with some 
finding almost nothing in the changes (privacy advocates and those 
who fear high prices for institutional subscriptions), while others 
will find their concerns addressed (foreign governments acting, one 
hopes, with the correct sense of the interests of foreign authors). 
The amended settlement agreement clearly responds to the 
concerns raised by the Department of Justice. In waiving the 
benefits of possible doctrines of antitrust immunity, the ASA 
solves a timing problem for DOJ. DOJ faced an all-or-nothing 
quandary: challenge the agreement now or risk the possibility 
losing the right to challenge it later. The Noerr waiver solves that 
problem. There may be real benefits to seeing how the pricing 
provisions play out in actual operating conditions. Don’t shadow 
box now but fight later if necessary. I could easily see DOJ or 
Judge Chin reaching that conclusion and choosing to defer 
consideration of the pricing issues to another day. 
The orphan works licensing is differently situated. The revised 
agreement creates a new unclaimed works fiduciary but does so in 
incomplete fashion. The UWF takes over some of the registry’s 
responsibilities rather than acting as a true fiduciary for orphan 
works holders. Such a fiduciary would be situated to license the 
orphan works to third parties on a going forward basis. That would 
have been an elegant solution to the competitive issues raised by 
the current plan to grant a license to the orphan works to Google 
and only to Google. The revised settlement makes real progress on 
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these issues only to stop short of a visible and attainable real 
solution. 
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